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already swiftly dispatched identi-
cal claims on the merits. In re-
jecting the plaintiffs’ claim, in 
Thomas More Law Center et al. v. Barack 
Hussein Obama et al., that the 2010 
health care reform is unconstitu-
tional, Judge George Steeh wrote 
on October 7 that according to a 
wealth of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, Congress’s power to 
regulate individual activity under 
the Commerce Clause (in this 
case, through a mandate that 
individuals obtain health insur-
ance) rests on whether the activ-
ity amounts to an “integral part 
of a broader regulatory statutory 
scheme that permissibly regu-
lates interstate commerce.”2 In 
this regard, Steeh’s opinion con-
tains two central and intertwined 
conclusions. First, “economic de-
cisions as to how to pay for health 
care services have direct and sub-
stantial impact on the interstate 
health care market.” Second, the 
“minimum coverage provision is 
essential to the Act’s larger reg-
ulation of the interstate business 
of health insurance.”2
Both of these elements are es-
sential to the holding. If there is 
no individual activity that directly 
and substantially affects inter-
state commerce, Congress cannot 
act. And if there is no broader 
statutory scheme regulating in-
terstate commerce, then the fed-
eral law will fail the constitution-
al test, as other laws have done.3,4
For reasons that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Michigan found 
relatively obvious, the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) satisfies the first of these 
two requirements. As Judge Steeh 
noted, the health care market is 
unlike any other market, because 
there is no way that “living breath-
ing beings” can opt out of it. Ev-
eryone needs health care at some 
point, and thus all of us are mar-
ket purchasers, however reluc-
tantly. How individuals buy health 
care is fundamentally a matter 
that affects the health care sys-
tem nationwide.
But in order to be constitu-
tional, a federal law must satisfy 
the second test: Congress must 
intervene in a manner that rises 
to the level of a broader regula-
tory scheme. Health care reform 
represents just such an interven-
tion, offering a comprehensive 
redesign of the U.S. health in-
surance market. The law funda-
mentally transforms health in-
surance from a product designed 
to preserve profitability in the face 
of rampant adverse selection to 
a regulated industry whose long-
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term strength and stability are 
essential to the public interest 
and that, in its restructured form, 
will therefore take on certain 
characteristics of a public utility.4,5
The redesign of U.S. health in-
surance to advance the national 
public interest addresses two pro-
found threats to the survival of a 
functional health care system that 
is capable of serving Americans’ 
needs. The first problem is that 
tens of millions of people are un-
insured, either as a matter of a 
deliberate choice or as the result 
of financial or health-related ex-
clusionary barriers. The second 
problem, triggered by the first, is 
rampant shifting of costs onto 
millions of other Americans who 
have chosen to be insured and are 
fortunate enough to be able to 
obtain coverage.
Of course, the individual man-
date is central to the legislative 
scheme, since without a large pool 
of healthy adults and children, it 
is simply impossible to create the 
market conditions for stable health 
insurance — a fact that is univer-
sally recognized by economics ex-
perts. But if the ACA stopped at 
mandating coverage — leaving 
Americans to fend for themselves 
in finding products that would 
adequately finance health care for 
them and their families — it might 
not achieve the stature essential to 
a broad regulatory scheme.
The ACA represents a consti-
tutional intervention into the 
health insurance market because 
of a combination of five results 
that it achieves. First, and per-
haps most fundamentally, in a 
remarkable shift whose precedent 
lies in the watershed Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the ACA transforms 
health insurance into a public ac-
commodation. The Civil Rights 
Act barred private businesses such 
as hotels, bus companies, and 
restaurants from refusing to sell 
their products or services to cus-
tomers on the basis of race. The 
ACA bars state-licensed health 
insurers from refusing to sell 
products to individuals on the 
basis of health status. This pro-
hibition, which bars rescissions 
— the canceling of policies of 
people who become ill — and 
which applies at both the point 
of initial sale and the point of 
renewal, is binding on health in-
surers nationwide, regardless of 
whether they sell their products 
in the open market or through 
state health insurance exchanges. 
This basic reconceptualization 
of health insurance as a good 
whose availability is a matter of 
national public interest essentially 
frames health insurance the way 
the Civil Rights Act framed oth-
er business interests.
Second, the ACA establishes 
minimum national standards gov-
erning the design of health in-
surance sold in the individual and 
group-plan markets, as well as the 
design of self-insured employer-
sponsored plans. In all insurance 
markets, these standards include 
bans against excessive waiting 
periods and against the imposi-
tion of annual and lifetime cov-
erage limits, a requirement to 
cover preventive services with no 
cost sharing, and a requirement 
to cover routine medical costs 
associated with participation in 
clinical trials. In the individual 
and small-group markets, design 
regulation reaches further, spec-
ifying a minimum level of cover-
age for “essential health bene-
fits” and limits on exposure to 
out-of-pocket costs for those es-
sential benefits. Equally impor-
tant are new rules that, accord-
ing to a strategy of measuring 
the medical loss ratio (the pro-
portion of money collected in 
premiums that is actually spent 
on medical care), position the in-
dustry for greater price regulation 
as a result of increased trans-
parency of cost increases and 
their justifications.
Third, the ACA creates a na-
tionwide system of health insur-
ance exchanges serving the indi-
vidual and small-group markets 
and gives states the option to 
expand their exchanges to reach 
larger groups. The law encourag-
es states to establish and operate 
their own exchanges but guaran-
tees access to a federally admin-
istered exchange in states that 
elect not to do so. Health insur-
ance sold through exchanges will 
be subject to “qualified health 
plan” requirements, which are 
aimed at ensuring not only the 
integrity of coverage, but also, 
by stipulating that each plan’s 
provider network must be ade-
quate, the availability of afford-
able health care itself.
Fourth, the ACA establishes a 
uniform, national subsidy system 
that ensures Medicaid coverage 
for the poorest Americans and 
advance tax credits for insurance 
premiums for individuals and 
families who are not eligible for 
Medicaid but have low-to-mod-
erate incomes. States, of course, 
participate in Medicaid on a vol-
untary basis, but all participating 
states will be required to extend 
coverage to newly eligible indi-
viduals, just as many previous 
Medicaid reforms have created 
new mandatory categories of ben-
eficiaries. In this case, the new 
expectations are accompanied by 
considerable new funding.
Finally, the ACA uses the plat-
form of uniform, stable financing 
to begin to change health care 
itself, on a nationwide basis. The 
law provides for a major invest-
ment in primary care through an 
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expansion of federally qualified 
health centers. This investment is 
coupled with a series of health 
care cost-cutting measures, as well 
as the establishment of national 
frameworks for quality improve-
ment and public health and pre-
vention, as well as pilot and dem-
onstration projects that aim to 
improve the quality and efficien-
cy of health care for the entire 
population over time.
The fundamental goal of the 
ACA is no less than the preser-
vation of the U.S. health care sys-
tem. In a country that depends 
on health insurance to finance 
care, preservation cannot happen 
without a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme that reaches from 
coast to coast and sets the mini-
mum rules of market entry and 
operation for health insurers. The 
glide path to this new system is 
long and complex, but the law’s 
end point is clear and visionary, 
and its constitutionality — at 
least in this first round — is in-
controvertible.
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Writing New Rules for Insurers — Progress on the Medical 
Loss Ratio
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D.
Few undertakings in the short history of the implementa-
tion of health care reform have 
been as difficult or contentious 
as the drafting of regulations to 
define the statute’s “medical loss 
ratio” requirement. Beginning in 
2011, health insurers must re-
port annually the percentage of 
their premium revenue (excluding 
expenditures for taxes and regu-
latory fees) that they spend on 
“reimbursement for clinical ser-
vices” and on “activities that im-
prove health care quality.” This 
is their medical loss ratio. If the 
medical loss ratio of an insurer 
in the individual or small-group 
market falls below 80% (or, for 
large-group insurers, 85%), the in-
surer must rebate to its enrollees 
the difference between the report-
ed ratio and the target percentage.
Traditionally, medical loss ra-
tios were of interest only to in-
vestors. An insurer with a low or 
“favorable” ratio was spending 
less on health care and produc-
ing a greater profit, and thus rep-
resented a good investment. The 
Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) reverses the 
incentives — too little spent on 
health care or quality improve-
ment results in a rebate. The pur-
pose of the statute, however, is 
not to produce rebates, but rather 
to give insurers an incentive to 
become more efficient. Some in-
surers currently spend as little as 
60% of their premium revenues 
on health care.1 The law should 
change that. It will also increase 
transparency — consumers will 
see how much of their premium 
dollars is actually spent on health 
care, which is, after all, why con-
sumers buy insurance.
In an unusual move, Congress 
delegated to the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC) the task of establishing 
the definitions and methods to 
be used for calculating loss ra-
tios. The NAIC, for which I serve 
as a consumer representative, has 
traditionally coordinated state reg-
ulatory efforts to make insurance 
regulation more uniform. Rarely, 
however, has it been called on to 
draft regulations for the federal 
government.
Given the special expertise of 
the state insurance commission-
ers in insurance regulation, as 
well as the spirit of cooperative 
federalism that underlies the 
health care reform law, asking the 
NAIC to draft the regulations 
made sense. But under the ACA, 
the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) reserves 
the responsibility for “certifying” 
the NAIC’s proposal before it be-
comes federal law.
The NAIC began the task of 
drafting the loss-ratio regulation 
soon after the reform law was 
adopted, appointing two working 
groups of regulators. One drafted 
the form that insurers will use 
to report loss ratios. This group 
also defined the categories of 
expenses that will be reported. 
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